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ABSTRACT 
This thesis analyzes the potential benefits of implementing a unique auction model that 
provides community and compensation managers with the ability to control for the 
quality and quantity of sailors retained.  The study utilizes survey data to estimate 
officers’ preference parameters and compare the cost, quantity and quality of Surface 
Warfare Officers (SWO) retained by the current SWO bonus, a standard uniform-price 
auction, and a quality adjusted discount (QUAD) auction.   
The results demonstrate efficiency improvements over the current retention 
system.  The thesis supports the findings from previous research on QUAD auctions, and 
confirms the hypothesis that increases in quality do not necessarily create cost increases. 
Findings from this thesis can be used in future retention and compensation 
policies to more cost effectively shape the force while maintaining or enhancing quality. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND 
In a period of increased fiscal scrutiny and imminent budget cuts, the Department 
of Defense (DoD) is facing significant budget cuts over the next decade and beyond.  As 
manpower and equipment costs continue to rise, the DoD is under pressure to find cost 
savings while maintaining capabilities, readiness, and effectiveness.  In addition, the DoD 
is expected to face increased manning challenges as the economy recovers and the all-
volunteer force (AVF) is forced to compete harder with the private sector for quality 
personnel. 
Each branch of the DoD employs some version of enlistment or retention bonuses 
to meet manning requirements.  The Navy uses a combination of bonuses to retain 
Surface Warfare Officers (SWOs), the Junior Officer Critical Skills Retention Bonus 
(JCRSB) and Surface Warfare Officer Continuation Pay (SWOCP)—commonly referred 
to together as the “SWO Bonus”—totaling $75,000.00, to meet its retention goals.  Even 
with the large bonus and recent tougher economic times, the Navy perennially struggles 
to meet its goal of 275 SWOs retained for Department Head (DH) tours.  This presents 
challenges both the slating and recruiting process for the manpower community. 
B. PURPOSE  
The purpose of this research is to analyze the benefits of the Navy incorporating a 
unique auction model to assign the SWO Bonus.  The study examines the feasibility and 
potential cost savings of utilizing a Quality Adjusted Discount (QUAD) Auction that 
provides the ability to control for the quality and quantity of sailors retained.  The study 
uses a survey of former, current, and future SWO Bonus-eligible officers to compare the 
current system against a standard uniform-price auction and a QUAD Auction 
mechanism by evaluating the cost and quality of officer retained of each system.  Results 
from this thesis could be used in the future to more cost effectively shape the force while 
maintaining or enhancing quality. 
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C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 Estimate preference parameters (reservation value, outside option, etc.) of 
the service members. 
 Examine the potential cost savings from the Navy’s utilization of a QUAD 
Auction to assign the SWO Bonus. 
 Explore the impact of a QUAD Auction on the quality of officers retained 
by the Navy through Surface Warfare Officer Bonus—the Surface 
Warfare Officer Continuation Pay (SWOCP) and Junior Officer Critical 
Skills Retention Bonus (JCRSB). 
D. THESIS SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
This thesis focuses on Naval Officers eligible to receive the SWO Bonus.  The 
scope includes: (1) analyze military pay and incentives, specifically SWOCP and JCRSB, 
(2) review basic auction theory and the QUAD model, (3) develop a survey to estimate 
parameters for the QUAD auction mechanism in the military labor market, (3) develop a 
process for scoring quality of officers, and (4) compare costs of the current SWO Bonus 
with auction simulations. 
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II. MILITARY COMPENSATION OVERVIEW 
A. BASE PAY 
A servicemember’s base pay is based specifically on rank and years of service 
(YOS), and determined using pay tables updated annually.  It is the same across all 
branches of service and for all Military Operational Specialties (MOS) or warfare 
designators.  Base pay constitutes approximately 50 percent of a servicemember’s 
monetary compensation. 
B. ALLOWANCES 
In addition to base pay, eligible servicemembers receive housing, subsistence, and 
other allowances (Defense Travel Management Office, n.d.). 
1. HOUSING ALLOWANCES 
Servicemember housing benefits range from government-provided housing to a 
tax-exempt housing allowance, or some combination of the two, depending on the duty 
station.  Servicemembers are eligible to receive Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH) to 
offset the cost of housing   Servicemembers have the option of military housing or 
civilian quarters.  Members residing in military housing forego part or all of their BAH 
depending on the housing they are in: 
The Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH) is a U.S. based allowance 
prescribed by geographic duty location, pay grade, and dependency status. 
It provides uniformed Service members equitable housing compensation 
based on housing costs in local civilian housing markets within the United 
States when government quarters are not provided. (Defense Travel 
Management Office, n.d.) 
2. BASIC ALLOWANCE FOR SUBSISTENCE 
The Basic Allowance for Subsistence (BAS) is meant to offset the cost of meals.  
It is a flat amount based on the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) food 
cost index. 
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3. ADDITIONAL ALLOWANCES 
 Cost of Living Allowance (COLA): Paid in designated non-
contiguous locations 
 Overseas Housing Allowance (OHA): Paid overseas in lieu of 
BAH 
 Family Separation Allowance (FSA): Paid to servicemembers 
geographically separated from their dependents for thirty days or 
more. 
C. RETIREMENT 
Over the long term, retirement benefits make up a sizeable portion of a 
servicemember’s compensation package.  Servicemembers become vested after twenty 
years of service.  Officers are paid an annuity of 2.5-percent per year of service (capped 
at thirty years) times the average of the highest three years of the member’s basic pay.  
D. BONUS PROGRAMS 
Servicemembers are paid a variety of special and incentive pays depending on 
their warfare designator.  This thesis specifically focuses on Surface Warfare Officer 
retention, and will consider Surface Warfare Officer Continuation Pay (SWOCP) and 
Junior Surface Warfare Officer Critical Skills Retention Bonus (JSCRB), known together 
as the SWO Bonus, which are paid for completing two SWO department head afloat 
tours. 
1. SURFACE WARFARE OFFICER CONTINUATION PAY 
SWOCP is an incentive pay intended to assist the SWO community manager in 
meeting its retention goal, 275 department heads.  Currently, SWOCP pays a total of 
$50,000 spread over three to seven years, depending on when it is accepted (Navy 
Personnel Command, SWOCP). 
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2. JUNIOR SURFACE WARFARE OFFICER CRITICAL SKILLS 
RETENTION BONUS 
JSCRB is a $25,000 retention bonus paid separately from SWOCP.  JSCRB is 
paid to eligible O3’s in return for a commitment to remain on active duty through nine 
years of commissioned service or two department head tours.  It is paid out over the 
course of three years (Navy Personnel Command, Junior SWO CSRB).  
  6 
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III. INTRODUCTION TO BASIC AUCTIONS 
A. BACKGROUND 
Auctions are one of the oldest and most efficient market mechanisms used to sell 
goods and services.  They date as far back 500 B.C, and are currently used to sell 
everything from goods and services, such as livestock and real estate, to mineral rights, 
government contracts, treasury bills, and frequency spectrum rights (Milgram, 2004).  
Modern economists define auctions as, “an economic mechanism whose purpose is the 
allocation of goods (or services) and the formation of prices for those goods (or services) 
via a process known as bidding (Henderson, 2007, p. 21).  The role and strategy of 
participants is dependent on the type of auction being conducted, and the value each 
places on the object up for auction.   
B. AUCTION VOCABULARY AND TERMINOLOGY 
While auctions can differ slightly depending on the object, rules, and type of 
auction used, they all share a common terminology.  The following consists of a 
compilation of theses conducted at the Naval Postgraduate School.  All information is 
used courtesy of the following thesis authors: William N. Filip, Tony K. Verenna, and 
Christopher S. White. 
All auctions are made up of Bidders, Bid-Takers, Sellers, and Buyers.  Bidders are 
individuals or entities competing for the object up for auction.  The Bid-Takers are the 
individuals or entities that receive the bids or offers from the bidders. The Seller is the 
entity in procession of the object he is willing to provide for the right price.  The Buyer is 
the entity attempting to purchase the object from the seller for the lowest price possible. 
A Forward Auction is the most common auction.  It consists of a single seller 
offering an object to multiple buyers at the highest price he can get.  This type of auction 
is often used for the sale of livestock, automobiles, real estate, and collectibles such as art 
or antiques.  Multiple sellers and a single buyer, purchasing at the lowest price, constitute 
a Reverse Auction.  This is frequently used in the government contracting process, and is 
what this study focuses on. 
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Both bidders and bid-takers have a valuation of the object up for auction, this is 
the reservation price.  A bidder’s reservation price is the maximum he is willing to pay 
for an item in a forward auction.  The bid-taker’s reservation price is the minimum he is 
willing to accept in a reverse auction.  In some auctions, a reserve price is used to ensure 
that adequate funds are exchanged. 
Bidders submit their bids in a simultaneous and independent manner in Sealed-bid 
auctions.  Each bidder submits only one bid, and is unaware of what the other bidders are 
bidding.  In First-price auctions the winning bid, and the price paid to the seller, is the 
highest bid submitted.  Bidders tend to underbid their valuation in forward first-price 
auctions, and overbid in reverse first-price auctions.  In Second-price Sealed-bid auctions 
the winner pays the price of the second highest bid (first excluded).  A bidder’s bid is 
only used to determine if he won, not necessarily the price he pays.  This encourages 
bidders to submit a bid equal to their valuation of the object, and prevents a buyer from 
attempting to drive the price up or down to increase his profit or surplus. 
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IV. QUALITY ADJUSTED DISCOUNT (QUAD) AUCTIONS 
A. BACKGROUND 
A standard uniform-price auction is the multiple winner version of a second-price 
sealed-bid auction.  It is a reverse auction with a single buyer or bid-taker purchasing a 
good or service from multiple sellers or bidders.  Sellers’ sealed bids are ranked from 
lowest to highest.  The winners are the lowest bids below the buyer’s reservation value or 
number of bids he’s willing to purchase.  All winners receive a payout, equal to the first 
excluded bidder’s price.  Standard uniform-price auctions are dominant strategy incentive 
compatible, and encourage all sellers to bid their true reservation price. 
Table 1 is an example of a standard uniform-price auction attempting to retain 8 
officers, at the cheapest cost to the Navy.  The cutoff bid is the 8th cheapest bid, $9,974 
in this example.  Any bid below $9,974 is retained.  The first excluded bid is the 9th 
lowest bid, $11,810 in this example.  The winners, or retained officers, are each paid 
$11,810.  




Retained Bonus Paid 
1 $      4,382.00 1 1 $       11,810.00 
2 $      5,050.00 1 1 $       11,810.00 
3 $      5,153.00 1 1 $       11,810.00 
4 $      6,636.00 2 1 $       11,810.00 
5 $      8,037.00 3 1 $       11,810.00 
6 $      8,043.00 2 1 $       11,810.00 
7  $      9,891.00  4 1 $       11,810.00 
8  $      9,974.00  3 1 $       11,810.00 
9 $    11,810.00 3 0 $                       - 
10 $    12,161.00 4 0 $                       - 
11 $    13,491.00 5 0 $                       - 
12 $    14,252.00 5 0 $                       - 
13 $    15,578.00 5 0 $                       - 
14 $    16,070.00 5 0 $                       - 
15 $    16,879.00 5 0 $                       - 
Average Quality Average Cost Total Cost 
2.13 $                  6,298.67 $       94,480.00 
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B. MODEL DESCRIPTION 
QUAD is an auction model developed by Myung (2011). QUAD auctions differ 
from standard uniform-price auctions by utilizing monetary payments to discount high 
quality bids.  Each bidder’s quality is rated, and bids from bidders with a quality rating 
above a buyer determined threshold are discounted.   The discounted bids are re-ranked, 
and the winners are determined similarly to a standard uniform-price auction by 
comparing subsidized bids.  QUAD auctions are also dominant strategy incentive 
compatible. 
1. SELLERS 
In DoD retention applications, the servicemembers represent the sellers in an 
auction; they are attempting to maximize their total income by submitting retention bonus 
bids.  Each servicemember’s bid represents his reservation value for remaining on active 
duty.  The bids are sealed; each servicemember is afforded the opportunity to make one 
bid, made without knowledge of other competing bids.  QUAD auctions are dominant 
incentive compatible.  There is no incentive for the servicemembers to inflate their 
reservation values and bids, because they risk having their bid rejected.  Likewise, the 
incentive to underbid is mitigated by the risk of being retained below their true 
reservation value.  
2. BUYERS 
The DoD represents the buyer in retention auctions.  The DoD’s objective is to 
retain a desired number of servicemembers, minimize total costs, and attempt to retain 
higher quality level of officers within cost constraints. 
C. MODEL CONSTRUCT AND PROCESS 
Bidders (  ) are characterized by their bids (  ), reservation values (  ), and 
quality (  ).  Each bidder’s goal is to maximize his or her payoff (  ) by submitting a bid 
representative of true reservation value.  There are N bidders participating in the auction.  
The buyer’s goal is to retain M servicemembers.  In a QUAD auction, the buyer is able to  
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set the minimum quality level (  ) required to grant assistance (A) to qualified bids.  
After all bids are placed, the community manager calculates the quality adjusted bids 
(  ). 
  
  
                    
 
              
 
  
The bids are then ranked from highest to lowest (   
     
 ).  The M lowest quality 
adjusted bids are retained.      is set to the     bid, the first excluded bid.  Officers 
with   
     are retained and receive the following payout: 
   
                    
 
              
 
  
In the event of a tie, the officer with the higher    is retained.  If both officers 
have the same bid and same quality, both are retained.  Officers rejected by the retention 
auction compete for their reservation value in the civilian sector. 
Table 2 applies QUAD auction methodology to the previous standard uniform-
price auction example. (Table 1)  The bidders’ reservation values and quality scores are 
the same for demonstration purposes.  The QUAD example sets      and         .  
This means any officer with a quality score greater than or equal to 4 will have his or her 
bid discounted by $5,500.  The QUAD bids are ranked lowest to highest, and the cutoff 
bid is $8,037.  Officers with QUAD bids below $8,037 are retained and each paid the 
first excluded bid, $8,043.  Officers retained with quality scores greater than or equal to 
4 are paid an additional $5,500, bringing their payout to $13,543 each.  Note that the 
average quality has increased over the standard uniform-price auction from 2.13 to 2.63, 
and the total cost has decreased from $94,480 to $80,844. 
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Table 2.   Example Quality Adjusted Discount Auction 








Retained Bonus Paid 
1 $    4,382.00 1 $     4,382.00 1 1 $    8,043.00 
2 $    5,050.00 1 $     5,050.00 3 1 $    8,043.00 
3 $    5,153.00 1 $     5,153.00 4 1 $    8,043.00 
4 $    6,636.00 2 $     6,636.00 5 1 $    8,043.00 
5 $    8,037.00 3 $     8,037.00 8 1 $    8,043.00 
6 $    8,043.00 2 $     8,043.00 9 0 $               - 
7 $    9,891.00 4 $     4,391.00 2 1 $  13,543.00 
8 $    9,974.00 3 $     9,974.00 11 0 $               - 
9 $  11,810.00 3 $   11,810.00 15 0 $               - 
10 $  12,161.00 4 $     6,661.00 6 1 $  13,543.00 
11 $  13,491.00 5 $     7,991.00 7 1 $  13,543.00 
12 $  14,252.00 5 $     8,752.00 10 0 $               - 
13 $  15,578.00 5 $   10,078.00 12 0 $               - 
14 $  16,070.00 5 $   10,570.00 13 0 $               - 
15 $  16,879.00 5 $   11,379.00 14 0 $               - 
Average Quality: Average Cost Total Cost 
2.625 $                 5,389.60 $                     80,844.00 
 
D. BIDDING STRATEGY 
An officer’s optimal bidding strategy is to truthfully reflect his reservation value 
for staying on active duty in his bid.  For example, a servicemember participating in a 
QUAD retention auction has an actual reservation value of $75,000.  He can either: 1) 
underbid, 2) truthfully bid, or 3) overbid.  Table 3 illustrates the possible outcomes from 
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Table 3.   Optimal Bidding Strategy in QUAD Retention Auction 
Does not qualify for assistance (     
 ), (  
      ) 
Reservation Value (  ): 
$75,000 
If Cutoff Bid is 
$60,000 (  ) 
If Cutoff Bid is 
$75,000 (  ) 
If Cutoff Bid is 
$90,000 (  ) 







Truthfully Bid $75,000 














Qualifies for assistance (     
 ), (  
      ), ($A=10,000) 
Reservation Value (  ): 
$75,000 
If Cutoff Bid is 
$60,000 (  ) 
If Cutoff Bid is 
$75,000 (  ) 
If Cutoff Bid is 
$90,000 (  ) 







Truthfully Bid $75,000 















The portion highlighted in green is the bidder’s optimal bidding strategy.  A 
bidder will always be retained at or above his reservation value if he bids truthfully, 
deviating from his truthful reservation value carries the potential to produce undesirable  
outcomes.  He risks being retained below his reservation value by underbidding. 
Similarly, he risks being rejected at a cutoff equal to or above his reservation value and 
foregoing a surplus by overbidding.    
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
QUAD auctions are reverse uniform-price auctions that function similarly to 
second-price sealed bid auctions.  They provide buyers, Navy manpower planners in this 
case, the ability to control for quality in addition to quantity, while endogenously 
determining the minimum cost.  Furthermore, QUAD retention auctions encourage  
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voluntary participation and bidders to bid their truthful reservation values, vice under or 
overbidding—bidding truthfully guarantees a payout greater than or equal to the bidder’s 
reservation value. 
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V. RETENTION SURVEY 
A. BACKGROUND 
A survey of former, current, and future SWO Bonus-eligible officers is employed 
to conduct the comparison between the current SWO Bonus and QUAD Auction 
retention mechanisms.  The survey data is used to estimate the officer’s preference 
parameters and personal characteristics, such as reservation value or bid and quality 
rating.  The parameters are used to simulate retaining the surveyed officers utilizing the 
current SWO Bonus system, a standard uniform-price auction, and a QUAD auction to 
analyze potential cost savings and the impact on the quality of officers retained by each 
mechanism. 
B. SURVEY DEVELOPMENT AND DELIVERY 
An online survey was developed using Survey Monkey, an online collection 
service.  The questions were designed to determine an officer’s 1) reservation value for 
remaining on active duty and quantify his quality or value to the Navy to facilitate a 
QUAD Auction, and 2) estimate his earning in the civilian labor market, personal 
discount rate, and identify factors influencing his propensity to remain on active duty.  
The survey was targeted to Surface Warfare Officers (SWO) O4 and below that were, 
are, or will be eligible for the SWO Bonus.  A draft version of the survey was tested with 
a small group of Surface Warfare Officers. 
Upon receiving International Review Board (IRB) approval and authorization 
from the Naval Postgraduate School and Commander Naval Surface Forces Pacific Fleet 
(COMNAVSURFPAC), a link to the study was electronically distributed.  The study was 
open to students at the Naval Postgraduate School from February 1 to February 14, and 
officers stationed in the Pacific Fleet (PACFLT) from February 10 to February 24. 
A copy of the survey is included in Appendix B. 
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C. POPULATION AND SAMPLE STATISTICS 
Of the approximately 1700 officers targeted by the survey, there were 327—a 
response rate of 19.23%.  Two hundred thirteen of the respondents failed to provide 
enough usable data by skipping or incompletely answering questions used to determine 
reservation value and quality rating.  An additional six responses were dropped as 
statistical outliers, bringing the sample size for the retention mechanism analysis to 108. 
Table 4 provides a comparison of the Navy officer population and sample 
statistics utilizing the 2010 Department of Defense Demographics Report.  Overall, the 
survey sample was representative of the population.  Males, Asians, O2s, and O3s were 
overrepresented.  Females, Blacks, and O1s were underrepresented.  





Male 71.3% 87.0% 
Female 28.7% 13.0% 
White 81.4% 80.6% 
Black 8.3% 2.8% 
Asian 4.1% 8.3% 
Other 6.2% 8.3% 
O1 13.1% 4.9% 
O2 12.2% 21.6% 
O3 31.8% 58.8% 
O4 19.5% 14.7% 
Married 65.0% 61.8% 
Unmarried 35.0% 38.2% 
*2010 DoD Demographics Report 
 
D. ESTIMATION OF THE PARAMETERS 
The study uses the survey data to estimate the officers’ bids and quality rating. 
1. Bids 
The survey asks, “What is the MINIMUM BONUS you would need to be offered 
by the Navy to commit to two Department Head Afloat tours?”  The responses are used 
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to represent an officer’s bid or reservation value for remaining on active duty.  Table 5 
shows the summary statistics of the officers’ bids by pay grade.  The median bid for O1s, 
O2s, and O3s is $75,000, equivalent to the current SWO Bonus. 
Table 5.   Bid by Pay Grade 
 
Observations Mean Bid Median Bid Standard Deviation 
O1 5 $      71,000.00 $     75,000.00 $      21,330.73 
O2 22 $      97,045.45 $     75,000.00 $      90,167.29 
O3 60 $      86,166.67 $     75,000.00 $      68,928.65 
O4 15 $    102,333.33 $   100,000.00 $    122,370.44 
Sample 108 $      90,879.63 $     75,000.00 $      80,775.53 
 
Table 6 lists the summary statistics for the bids. 
Table 6.   Bid Summary Statistics 
Bid (  ) 
Mean  $              90,879.63  
Standard Error  $                7,772.63  
Median  $              75,000.00  
Mode  $              75,000.00  
Standard Deviation  $              80,775.53  
Sample Variance  $  6,524,686,310.14  
Kurtosis  $                        7.27  
Skewness  $                        2.24  
Range  $             500,000.00  
Minimum  $                              -    
Maximum  $             500,000.00  
Count  $                    108.00  
Largest(5)  $             250,000.00  
Smallest(5)  $                              -    
Confidence Level(95%)  $               15,408.33  
 
2. Quality Rating 
A bidder’s quality rating is a key component of a QUAD Auction.  It is used to 
determine whether or not an officer’s bid is discounted.  While the metric used for quality  
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rating is ultimately a policy question, it is necessary to compute quality rating for 
analytical purposes.  This thesis examines four methods of calculating an officer’s quality 
rating.   
All four methods utilize responses from the survey to create a rating that captures 
an officer’s personal on the job performance, qualifications, and experience.  The quality 
ratings are calculated by adding the values from each category or metric (  
 ) multiplied 
by the weight assigned (  ), dividing by the total number of possible points ( ), and 
multiplying by five.  This creates a quality rating (  ) on a scale of zero to five, five being 
the highest quality. 
      





The metrics and weights used for each method are explained below: 
a. Quality Method 1 
Quality method 1 utilizes the following metrics in its calculation:  
 Total years of active duty service 
 Number of deployments (longer than 90 days) completed 
 Number of different platforms the officer has been stationed on 
 If the officer has completed a topside and engineering tour 
 Average relative score on the previous two FITREPs 
An officer’s relative FITREP score is calculated by dividing the 
individual’s score by his reporting senior’s cumulative average at time of reporting.  This 
quantifies the individual’s performance in relation to the reporting group average.  This 
calculation is performed for the respondent’s two most recent FITREPs and averaged.   
 Personal awards and decorations 
The score for awards is calculated using the type and quantity of the 
highest and second highest personal decorations each officer received.  Points are 
assigned from one to five for the type of award, depending on the order of precedence.  
The points per award are multiplied by the quantity received.  This is done for the 
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officer’s highest and second highest awards and added together to get the “total award 
value.” The values assigned in this sample were: 
Award       Value 
Navy Achievement Medal    1 
Service Commendation Medal   2 
Joint Commendation Medal    3 
Meritorious Service Medal    4 
Defense Meritorious Service Medal   5 
Bronze Star      6 
 If an officer has achieved of the following benchmark 
qualifications: 
 Surface Warfare Officer (SWO) 
 Engineering Officer of the Watch (EOOW) 
 Tactical Action Officer (TAO) 
 Command Duty Officer (CDO) 
Years of active duty service, number of deployments, number of platforms 
served on, average relative FITREP score, and total award value are normalized using 
min-max normalization to assign each respondent a value from 0 to 1 in each category. 
Method 1 assigns equal weight (1) to each metric.  The following is an 
example of the calculation for an officer’s quality rating using method 1: 
Q1. How many total years of active duty service do you have? 
Answer: 13. 
Q2. How many deployments (>90 days) have you completed?   
Answer: 4. 
Q3. How many different platforms have you been stationed on?  
Answer: 5. 
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Q4.   Have you completed at least one “topside” AND engineering tour? 
Answer: Yes. 
Q6. From your most recent OBSERVED FITREP, please enter: 
Member Trait Average and Summary Group Average.   
Answer: 5.00, 4.71. 
Q7. From your second most recent OBSERVED FITREP, please enter: 
Member Trait Average and Summary Group Average.   
Answer: 4.83, 4.81. 
Q8. What is the highest U.S. military personal decoration / award 
you’ve received? And, how many?   
Answer: Navy Commendation Medal, 3. 
Q9. What is the second highest U.S. military personal decoration / 
award you’ve received? And, how many?   
Answer: Navy Achievement Medal, 5. 
Q10. Which of the following personal qualifications do you have, 
Surface Warfare Officer (SWO), Engineering Officer of the Watch (EOOW), Tactical 
Action Officer (TAO), Command Duty Officer (CDO)? 
Answer: SWO, EOOW, TAO, CDO 
Table 7 demonstrates the calculation for Quality Method 1. 
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Table 7.   Quality Method 1 Calculation 
Metric Response 









Years of Service 13 0.464 1 0.464 1 
# Deployments 4 0.333 1 0.333 1 
# of Platforms 5 1 1 1 1 
Topside and Eng. 
Tour 
Yes 1 1 1 1 
Average Relative 
FITREP 
1.024 0.305 1 0.305 1 
Total Award Value 11 0.733 1 0.733 1 
SWO Qualification Yes 1 1 1 1 
EOOW Qualification Yes 1 1 1 1 
TAO Qualification Yes 1 1 1 1 
CDO Qualification Yes 1 1 1 1 
Sum 




      
     
  
        
b. Quality Method 2 
Quality Method 2 uses all of the same metrics as Quality Method 1, but 
assigns different weights to each category.  Table 8 illustrates the respective weights 
assigned to each category and the calculation for Quality Method 2 using the same 
questions and answers as above. 
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Table 8.   Quality Method 2 Calculation 
Metric Response 









Years of Service 13 0.464 1 0.464 1 
# Deployments 4 0.333 2 0.666 2 
# of Platforms 5 1 1 1 1 
Topside and Eng. 
Tour 
Yes 1 1 1 1 
Average Relative 
FITREP 
1.024 0.305 5 1.525 5 
Total Award Value 11 0.733 3 2.199 3 
SWO Qualification Yes 1 1 1 1 
EOOW Qualification Yes 1 2 2 2 
TAO Qualification Yes 1 3 3 3 
CDO Qualification Yes 1 2 2 2 
Sum 




      
      
  
        
c. Quality Method 3 
Quality Method 3 narrows the metrics to years of service, number of 
platforms, completing a topside and engineering tour, average relative FITREP score, 
EOOW, TAO, and CDO qualifications.  It assigns an equal weight to each metric used.  
Table 9 demonstrates the calculation for Quality Method 3 using the same questions and 
answers as the previous two examples.   
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Table 9.   Quality Method 3 Calculation 
Metric Response 









Years of Service 13 0.464 1 0.464 1 
# of Platforms 5 1 1 1 1 
Topside and Eng. 
Tour 
Yes 1 1 1 1 
Average Relative 
FITREP 
1.024 0.305 1 0.305 1 
EOOW Qualification Yes 1 1 1 1 
TAO Qualification Yes 1 1 1 1 
CDO Qualification Yes 1 1 1 1 
Sum 




      
     
 
        
d. Quality Method 4 
Quality Method 4 uses the same metrics as Quality Method 3.  However, it 
assigns different weights to each metric used.  Table 10 illustrates the respective weights 
for each metric and the calculation for Quality Method 4 using the same questions and 
answers as the previous three examples.  For the purposes of this thesis, quality scores are 
calculated using Quality Method 4.  This method is the simplest way to adequately 
estimate an officer’s quality, value, and future performance to the Navy utilizing the 
survey data available.  
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Table 10.   Quality Method 4 Calculation 
Metric Response 









Years of Service 13 0.464 1 0.464 1 
# of Platforms 5 1 1 1 1 
Topside and Eng. 
Tour Yes 1 1 1 1 
Average Relative 
FITREP 1.024 0.305 5 1.525 5 
EOOW Qualification Yes 1 2 2 2 
TAO Qualification Yes 1 3 3 3 
CDO Qualification Yes 1 2 2 2 
Sum 




      
      
  
        
 
E. QUALITY METHOD COMPARISON AND SCORES 
When each quality method is applied to the sample, the scores are highly 
correlated.  This suggests that scores produced by one are likely to be similar to the 
scores produced by other methods.  Tables 11 and 12 show the summary statistics of each 
of the quality methods and the correlation between them.  
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Mean 2.697 2.314 2.727 2.406 
Standard Error 0.080 0.077 0.091 0.083 
Median 2.618 2.221 2.756 2.319 
Mode N/A N/A 3.518 2.638 
Standard Deviation 0.836 0.797 0.948 0.866 
Sample Variance 0.698 0.635 0.898 0.750 
Kurtosis -0.333 -0.589 -0.482 -0.562 
Skewness -0.181 0.053 -0.180 0.021 
Range 4.057 3.562 4.133 3.700 
Minimum 0.327 0.373 0.329 0.386 
Maximum 4.384 3.935 4.462 4.086 
Count 108 108 108 108 
Largest (5) 3.987 3.594 4.252 3.874 
Smallest (5) 1.212 0.944 1.018 0.835 
Confidence Level (95%) 0.159 0.152 0.181 0.165 
 










Quality Method 1 1 
   Quality Method 2 0.97 1 
  Quality Method 3 0.98 0.96 1 
 Quality Method 4 0.93 0.97 0.96 1 
 
The results of the survey are inconsistent with the hypothesis that higher quality 
bidders carry higher reservation values or bids.  This is likely due to the self-selection 
bias present in the voluntary survey.  Officers opting into the survey are likely to have 
lower reservation values than officers choosing not to participate; if they are motivated 
enough and willing to participate in a voluntary survey, they are may be more motivated 
about military service and contributions to research.   
In addition, the quality scores are heavily dependent on experience and time in 
service.  Number of platforms served on, deployments completed, variety of tours 
completed, personal awards, and qualifications received often increase over time, 
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increasing quality scores for officers with more time in service.  Officers with more time 
in service are also closer to retirement and qualification for the associated benefits, likely 
lowering their reservation values for remaining on active duty.   The correlation between 
the bids and quality score was -0.219.  Figure 1 is the graph of the bids versus quality 
score.  The r-square of 0.0479 indicates the data is not perfectly linear, and the slope of -
20,421 indicates bids decrease by roughly $20,000 for every 1 point increase in quality 
rating. 
Figure 1.   Bid Versus Quality Score 
 
 
y = -20421x + 140009 



















Bid vs Quality Score 
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VI. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Once the bids and quality scores are estimated from the survey data, the 
parameters are entered into four models in Microsoft Excel to conduct simulation runs.  
The first model represents the current bonus system, simply setting the SWO Bonus equal 
to $75,000.  The second model utilizes a standard-uniform price auction, and attempted to 
retain 34% of the bids submitted.  The third model is a QUAD Auction optimized to 
minimize cost, and the fourth model is a QUAD Auction optimized to maximize the 
median quality of the officers retained.  The total cost, median quality, and quantity of 
offices retained by each model are used to evaluate the potential cost savings and quality 
increases by each model against the current system. 
B. MODEL RESULTS ANALYSIS 
The survey data produced 108 usable bids or participants.  In order to most 
accurately model the retention goals and behavior of the SWO community, the 
simulations attempt to retain 37 officers, 34% of the 108 participants.  The SWO 
community currently assesses approximately 800 officers each year to meet its goal of 
275 SWO department heads, 34% of the officers assessed, by the 7 year mark.  Table 13 
summarizes the quantity, quality, and cost of the officers retained by each model. 
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Threshold (  ) 
  2 3 
QUAD Allowance 
(A) 
- - $           20,250 $           75,250 
Number Retained 65 37 37 37 
Average Cost $        75,000 $           60,000 $           48,608 $           83,979 
Total Cost $   4,875,000 $      2,400,000 $      1,798,500 $      3,107,250 
Median Quality 2.64 2.80 2.90 3.23 
* Sample size 108 
* Retention Target 37 (34%) 
 
1. Current SWO Bonus and Retention System 
The current SWO Bonus and retention mechanism is used as a baseline for 
comparison against the standard uniform-price auction and two QUAD auctions.  
$75,000, the current total SWO Bonus, is used.  Any officer with a reservation value or 
bid less than or equal to $75,000 is retained.  This is how the current system functions, 
any officer willing to accept the SWO Bonus and complete two SWO Department Head 
tours is retained and paid the bonus.   
This model retains 65 officers, 75% more than the targeted 37.  The total and 
average costs of the current system produced by the model are $4,875,000 and $75,000, 
respectively.  The average cost is important to note for comparison sake, since the model 
over retains.  The median quality of officers retained by the current system is 2.64. 
While the current system historically suffers from under retention in practice, it 
suffers from over retention in this study. The inability to control for the quantity of 
officers retained is an inherent weakness and inefficiency of the current retention 
mechanism; it can produce manpower shortages or excess costs.  The over retention in 
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the model is caused by self-selection bias in survey.  Participants likely have a higher 
propensity to accept the SWO Bonus and remain on active duty than officers declining to 
participate in the survey, skewing the retention rate in the sample compared to the 
population.  
2. Standard Uniform-Price Auction 
The standard uniform-price auction ranks the officer’s bids, retains the 37 lowest 
bids, and pays the retained officers the 38
th
 lowest bid (first excluded bid).  The total and 
average costs of the standard uniform-price auction model are $2,400,000 and $60,000, 
respectively.  The median quality is 2.80. 
While the current system model has significant over retention, the standard 
uniform-price auction retains exactly 37 officers.  The standard uniform-price auction 
provides $2,475,000 or 50.77% savings over the current system in total costs.  Although 
much of these savings result from precisely achieving the retention target, the average 
cost per officer retained also decreases from $75,000 to $60,000, or 20%. 
3. Quality Adjusted Discount Auction (Optimized to Minimize Cost) 
In total, 2,185 simulation runs varying   and A are made using Excel data tables 
to minimize the total cost.  The simulations find the minimum cost is obtained by setting 
  to 2 and A to $20,250.  Officers with a quality level greater than or equal to 2 have 
their bids discounted by $20,250.  Like the standard uniform-price auction, the QUAD 
model retains exactly 37 officers.  The total and average costs are $1,798,500 and 
$48,608, respectively.  The median quality of the officers retained 2.90. 
This QUAD model increases the quality 9.85% and 3.57% over the current 
system and standard uniform-price auction, respectively.  In addition to the quality 
increases, this model produces a total cost savings of $3,076,500 or 63.1% over the 
current system. 
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4. Quality Adjusted Discount Auction (Optimized to Maximize Quality) 
By altering the quality discount threshold,     and the assistance level, A, 
community, compensation, and bonus managers have the flexibility to balance the quality 
of the officers retained against the total retention costs.  To demonstrate this flexibility 
and control, the 2,185 simulations are run again to find the   and A that produce the 
highest average quality rating.  The simulations find the highest average quality rating is 
realized by setting    to 3 and A to $75,250.  Officers with a quality level greater than or 
equal to 3 have their bids discounted by $75,250.  This QUAD model also retains exactly 
37 officers.  The total and average costs are $3,107,250 and $83,979, respectively.  The 
median quality of the officers retained 3.23. 
This QUAD model increases the quality 22.3% over the current system.  In this 
study, this is the equivalence of an officer with member trait averages 15% above 
summary group averages.  This model’s total cost is still $1,767,750, or 36.3% lower 
than the current system. 
C. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The results of the simulations demonstrate that auction mechanisms give 
manpower planners the ability to control for the quantity of officers retained.  All three 
auction mechanisms, the standard uniform-price and both QUAD auctions, achieve the 
exact retention target in each of the models.   
In addition, QUAD auctions give community, compensation, and bonus managers 
additional flexibility to control for quality.  Both QUAD auctions, minimum total cost 
and maximum quality, increase the quality to 2.90 and 3.23, respectively, while still 
saving money over the current system.  The QUAD auction designed to minimize total 
costs achieves a 63.1% cost savings over the current system, and the QUAD auction 
optimized to maximize quality increases quality 22.3% over the current system. 
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VII. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION 
A. SUMMARY 
The purpose of this study is to explore the potential benefits of utilizing a unique 
quality adjusted discount (QUAD) auction to assign retention bonuses.  The study 
analyzes the impact of auction mechanisms on the quantity, quality, and cost of retaining 
Surface Warfare Officers utilizing survey data of 327 former, current, and future SWO 
Bonus-eligible officers from the Naval Postgraduate School and on ships throughout the 
Pacific Fleet.  Reservation values or bids and quality ratings are estimated using the 
survey data to conduct several simulations and comparisons between the current SWO 
Bonus retention mechanism, a standard uniform-price auction, and QUAD auctions.  The 
methodology is similar to White (2010) and Pearson (2011), but uses survey data and 
focuses solely on retention and the US Navy. 
The results from this thesis could be used by community, compensation, and 
bonus managers in the future to more efficiently shape the force.  Manpower managers 
will have the flexibility to balance the quantity and quality of the officers retained against 
the costs. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
The study and simulations demonstrate efficiency improvements over the current 
retention system.  The thesis supports the findings from previous research on QUAD 
auctions, and confirms the hypothesis that increases in quality do not necessarily create 
cost increases (Table 13).   
The reservation values estimated from the survey have a weak and nonlinear, but 
negative, correlation between an officer’s quality rating (Figure 1).  This is likely due to 
the combination of metrics used to determine quality and self-selection bias from the 
voluntary survey. 
The flexibility to control for quantity produces cost savings for the Navy in two 
ways.  First, the Navy can precisely meet retention targets, eliminating manning 
shortages associated with under retention, and excess costs from over retaining.  Second, 
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market design and auction mechanisms allow the Navy to alter its accession policies.  
The Navy currently assesses significantly more junior officers than it requires to 
accommodate lateral transfers and attrition that occurs over time.  Initially, over-
assessing personnel carries significant recruiting, training, and labor costs.  Uniform price 
auctions allow the Navy to tailor its accession numbers to its current manning needs 
instead of over accessing in hopes of meeting retention goals years later. 
In addition to controlling the retention quantity, auction mechanisms 
endogenously determine the lowest cost.  The current bonus and retention system is based 
on historical trends and predictions of how much to offer servicemembers to retain.  
Auctions utilize voluntary participation and actual reservation values from the bidders to 
determine the servicemember supply curve.  Compensation and bonus managers can use 
the known reservation values and corresponding supply curve along with the retention 
target to find the optimal retention bonus required. 
Finally, quality discount auctions allow the Navy to control for the quality of the 
force.  Manpower planners can opt to “buy” more or less quality by altering the quality 
discount threshold and assistance level provided.  This allows the Navy to maximize 
quality within budgetary constraints.   
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
This study uses survey data to build on previous models.  Experimental data from 
a controlled environment can mitigate the issues associated with survey data, and allow 
for more rigorous testing of the QUAD mechanism.  A laboratory environment will allow 
facilitators to explain the rules of the auction and implications of attempting to under or 
over bid actual reservation values to the participants.  Upon completion of experimental 
or laboratory evaluations, QUAD auctions should be implemented in small communities 
prior to wide-scale implementation.   
Ultimately, the quality metrics, quality discount threshold, and assistance level 
used by the QUAD mechanism are policy questions.  Assistance from community, 
compensation, and bonus managers will be required to identify the appropriate metrics 
and levels to use to optimize the outcome. 
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APPENDIX A.  AUCTIONS 
The following is an excerpt from a thesis written by Tony K. Verenna (2007) 
while attending the Naval Postgraduate School. 
TYPES OF AUCTIONS 
1. Ascending-Bid (English Auction) 
This type of auction is the most common. It involves bidders raising the price 
until only one buyer is left. This auction can be run three ways: 1. The seller announces 
prices, 2. the bidders call out their prices, or 3. bids can be submitted electronically with 
the best current price listed (Klemperer, 2004). 
2. Descending-Bid (Dutch Auction) 
This type of auction is exactly the opposite of the ascending-bid auction. In this 
scenario, the price starts out higher than any buyer is willing to pay and lowers 
continuously until the first bidder is willing to accept the good at the current price 
(Klemperer, 2004). 
3. First-Price Sealed Bid 
This type of auction consists of each bidder submitting their bid without the 
knowledge of the other bidders. In this scenario, the good goes to the bidder who has 
submitted the highest bid and the winner pays the price they bid (Klemperer, 2004). 
4. Second-Price Sealed Bid 
This type is very similar to the first-price sealed bid auctions. In this scenario, the 
winner is still the bidder who has submitted the highest bid; however, the bidder only has 
to pay the price of the second highest (or first excluded) bid (Klemperer, 2004). 
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KEY FEATURES 
1. Forward Versus Reverse 
a.  Forward Auction 
A Forward Auction is the most common form of auctioning and one that is 
most familiar. It involves a single seller of a good and multiple buyers bidding for the 
right to purchase that good. Usually the winner of this type of auction is the bidder who 
submits the highest bid. 
b.  Reverse Auction 
A reverse auction consists of one buyer and multiple sellers vying for a 
specific good. In a reverse auction, the winner is the bidder with the lowest bid. 
2. First-Price Versus Second-Price Bidding Strategies 
a.  First-Price 
In a forward auction, the winning bidder pays what he bid for the item; in 
a reverse auction the bidder gets paid what he bid. In the forward auction, if the bidder 
wins the auction that is below his private-value, then he receives a profit. In a reverse 
auction, the bidder who wins the auction above his reserve price receives a surplus. 
Bidders can use information or “signals” to determine the amount they are going to bid to 
maximize their profit or surplus. Bidders will under bid their true valuation in a forward 
auction and they will bid above their true valuation in a reverse auction. 
b.  SecondPrice 
In a forward auction, the winning bidder pays an amount equal to the 
second highest bid. In a reverse auction, the winner is paid an amount equal to the first 
non-winning bid. In each case, one’s bid is only used to determine if he is the winner. 
The amount the bidder pays or gets paid depends on the bids of others. In both types of 
auctions, the dominant strategy is for each bidder to submit a bid equal to their true 
valuation of the item. 
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3.  Common Value versus Independent Private-Value 
a.  Common Value 
The value of the item is common or the same for each bidder; however, 
bidders have different private information about what the value actually is. For example, 
the value of land that supposedly has oil underground will have the same value to any 
buyer who plans to drill the oil. Bidders may have access to different “signals” about the 
amount of oil located underground, so they may have different perceptions about its 
common value. In this case, bidders might change their estimate if they learned of 
another bidder’s signal. 
b.  Independent Private-Value 
The value of the item is whatever the individual bidder values the item to 
be. This information is private to the bidder. This does not preclude bidders from 
changing their bid to gain an advantage once they find out the bids of others. An example 
of this would encompass a contractor bidding on a job. The contractor knows what the 
job will likely cost him; however, he does not know what it will cost other contractors. 
4.  Open Versus Sealed-Bid 
a.  Open Auctions 
An open auction consists of the bidders knowing the competitions’ bids. 
Bids can be called out by an auctioneer, the bidders can call out their bids, or a bid can be 
posted electronically. The key to an open auction is that bidders know what others are 
bidding. 
b.  Sealed-Bid 
In a sealed-bid auction, the bidder only knows his bid. All bids are 
submitted somewhat simultaneously as each bidder submits one bid. In this case, the 
bidders must estimate what other bidders may bid to maximize their chances of winning. 
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FACTORS WHEN DECIDNG AUCTION FORMAT 
Several factors need to be considered when deciding on the type of auction to be 
used. The objectives may differ for each seller in different auctions. According to the 
Revenue Equivalence Theorem (RET), the design of the auction does not matter as each 
type generally yields the same revenue for the seller. The following factors should be 
considered when designing an auction: 
1.  Revenue Equivalence 
According to the RET, all four types of auctions yield the same revenue on 
average under the following assumptions: 
- Bidders are risk neutral 
- Independent private-values assumption applies 
- Symmetric bidders (each draws from similar probability distributions) 
- Payment is based only on bids 
If these four criteria are met, it does not matter which design is chosen and the 
expected value for each auction will be generally the same. For example, the English and 
second-price sealed-bid auctions will yield the same revenue as the winner pays the 
second highest value. In the Dutch and first-priced sealed-bid auctions, the winner will 
attempt to outbid his competition by the slightest value to maximize his economic rent. 
By meeting the four criteria described above, the RET would prove to be correct. 
However, most auctions will fail to meet the criteria of the RET and bidders tend to act 
differently within each design.  Klemperer raises the issue of collusion and the 
attractiveness to potential bidders as reason for susceptibility. An auction designer needs 
to understand the purpose of the auction to design it correctly. 
2.  Risk Tolerance among Bidders 
Information is a key aspect in all forms of auctions. In the open form auctions, 
bidders can view their competitors’ bids; whereas, in sealed bid auctions, the bidder is 
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dependent on the information he has gathered to submit a bid based on his value. The 
amount of information or lack of information creates uncertainty and risk.  
Generally, a risk neutral bidder’s behavior is not affected by an increase in risk, 
and, therefore, such a bidder will approach all types of auctions in the same manner. On 
the other hand, most individuals are risk averse and will attempt to decrease their risk and 
increase their certainty. A risk averse person will tend to bid more aggressively to 
increase the probability of winning and reduce the uncertainty. This also would decrease 
the surplus value received from the product if a risk-averse individual is the winning 
bidder. Risk averse bidders will typically generate higher values for the sellers in the 
Dutch and first-price sealed bid auctions compared to the English and second-price sealed 
bid auctions. 
3.  Collusion 
Individual bidders would like to collude in auctions to keep prices at a minimum. 
In open auctions, collusion could occur through signals among bidders or through the bid 
itself, especially if the product is of value to the bidder. In addition, a bidder who is not 
cooperating with a colluder could be forced into paying a much higher price for an item 
than if the bidder had cooperated. In sealed-bid auctions, collusion is very rare as there is 
no communication between the players in the bidding process; collusion requires pre-
agreement concerning the sealed bids. A seller would obviously attempt to thwart 
collusion, using one of the following options. First, the seller can set a reserve price (see 
below). Second, if the seller becomes aware that collusion is occurring, the item being 
auctioned can be removed and saved for another day. Third, an auctioneer could remove 
suspected colluders from the auction. Finally, an auctioneer could revert to unethical 
practices and utilize a ghost bidder to raise the price of an auction. 
4. Reserve Price 
For a seller to guarantee an appropriate profit, he may set a reserve price. This is a 
minimum price (forward auction) or maximum price (reverse auction) set at the outset to 
guarantee minimum revenue or maximum cost. These prices must be set carefully so they 
don’t discourage potential bidders from bidding. For example, in a forward auction a 
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seller could set a reserve price of $500 for an item when a bidder values that item to be 
$400. As a result, this potential bidder would not participate in this auction. If this reserve 
price scares off all potential bidders, the seller would lose his sale even though he could 
have potentially received his value through the auction.  
Setting reserve prices could also deter collusion. If the seller sets his price to 
receive a profit, he will get bids assuming the price is not too high. It would not matter if 
colluders minimized the value or the bids; the seller would still receive some profits. 
Overall, setting a reserve price would reduce the incentive for bidders to cooperate. 
5. Private Information 
As stated previously, information is a key aspect to an auction. Information would 
include knowledge of the product or service, quantity available, historical sales, or 
competition involved. The value of an item to an individual could differ depending on 
how much he knows about that item. Auctioneers tend to provide information that would 
increase the bids to increase revenue. On the other hand, certain information may cause 
bidders to revise their bids downward. An auctioneer or seller must decide what and how 
much information to divulge to the bidder. 
Information can also increase uncertainty. If a seller releases certain information 
that may cause a bidder to increase his value of an item, then the risk averse bidder would 
increase his bid to increase his probability of winning the item. 
6. Number of Bidders 
An increase in competition or the number of bidders usually increases the seller’s 
revenue. In this case, it would be to the seller’s benefit to increase participation in an 
auction. This could also serve the purpose of a reserve price. In Dutch and first-price 
sealed bid auctions, more bidders tend to generate higher bids for an item as increased 
competition (uncertainty) and risk aversion cause participants to alter their bids; whereas 
increased competition in an English or second-price sealed bid auction would not change 
the bidding strategy, as the bidder only bids his value of an item regardless of the 
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competition (however, the highest and second highest valued bids are likely to increase 
with increased participation). 
7. Other Factors 
Auction design can be influenced by other factors. These include: entry fees to 
participate in an auction, time limits instilled for the auction, and a middleman 
representing the bidder. 
Entry fees could be charged to participate in an auction. This could separate those 
undesirable bidders from the more serious bidders. In addition, an entry fee resembles a 
reserve price, as those with low valuations of an item would be excluded. One drawback 
to an entry fee, especially in an assignment or bonus setting, would be that individual 
bidders would tire of submitting bids if it becomes non-refundable and the guarantee of 
return dwindles. 
Time limits would control the amount of information that individual bidders could 
collect on other bidders to determine their value of an item or a competitor’s bidding 
strategy. Time limits would also increase uncertainty. As stated previously, a risk averse 
participant would bid more aggressively to decrease uncertainty. A tight time limit 
imposed on an assignment or bonus auction for the military would not necessarily be 
suitable. Military personnel are dispersed throughout the world and information on 
auctions and ways to submit bids may not always be available in a timely manner. 
The last factor to consider is that of the middleman. A middleman could represent 
the bidder. To do this, the middleman must know the bidder’s valuation and must 
definitely know the bidder’s maximum bid in a forward auction and the minimum bid in 
a reverse auction. Also, it would be in the best interest of both the seller and the bidder 
for the middleman to know some information about the item up for bid. A positive aspect 
of the middleman includes the fact that military personnel could still participate in an 
auction no matter what their geographical or technological status, assuming they 
understand the previous issues. 
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